This paper revisits the economic analysis of contract law for a setting of cooperative investments. While Che and Chung (1999) have shown that expectation damages perform rather poorly, the present paper argues that this negative result follows from their impicit assumption of unilateral expectation damages. Yet, the very nature of cooperative investments gives rise to the possibility that both parties may claim expectation damages. It is shown that such a regime of bilateral expectation damages provides the incentives for the …rst best solution even in a framework of binary choice where, for sel…sh investments, the traditional overreliance result would hold.
Introduction
In a setting of relationship-speci…c investments, Che and Chung (1999) have explored various breach remedies for investments that generate direct bene…ts to the investing party's trading partner. Such cooperative investments as they are called are important for buyer-supplier alliances in industrial purchasing. Che and Chung mention investments by a supplier that increase the quality of a good or service procured by the buyer, e¤orts to customize components to the special needs of manufacturers and workers' paying attention to their jobs as examples of cooperative investments. Their main …ndings are that expectation damages perform very poorly, privately stipulated liquidated damages generate better but still ine¢cient incentives to invest and reliance damages perform the best.
These results stand in contrast to the earlier …ndings of the literature which has mainly dealt with sel…sh investments. Examples of such investments include situations where a supplier invests to lower his production costs or reliances of a buyer who expects the supplier to perform. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) show that, for sel…sh investments and in a setting of continuous quantity choice, expectation damages may well generate e¢cient incentives to invest. Shavell (1980) considers sel…sh investments followed by a binary choice. He shows that expectation damages lead to overreliance but less so than reliance damages. Rogerson (1984) extends Shavell's analysis to the case where ex post negotiations always occur successfully and costlessly.
Expectation damages still outperform reliance damages if, at the investment stage, the parties anticipate renegotiations.
The present paper revisits cooperative investments. While German contract law serves as background, other legal systems seem very similar with respect to what matters for the present analysis. In principle, the promisee is entitled to speci…c performance. But, for practical purposes, a substantial part of all cases are governed by expectation damages. 1 The promisee, instead of expectation damages, can also claim reliance damages. damages exceed expectation damages at that stage. Therefore, at least under German contract law, the question of whether reliance damages outperform expectation damages is of lesser concern. If the promisee does not claim reliance damages he will be granted expectation damages, no matter which of the two perform better. As a matter of fact, in a setting such as the one studied by Che and Chung, reliance damages would give the promisee zero net pro…ts while, under expectation damages, he would end up, in monetary terms, as if the promisor had performed. Given that the promisee has accepted the contract initially, his net pro…t under performance will typically be positive. Therefore the promisee, in case of breach, would claim expectation and not reliance damages. Section 4 compares the …ndings of the present paper with those of Che and Chung (1999) who examine unilateral expectation damages where the investing party only may claim damages. Section 5 revisits liquidated damages in a setting, though, which mimics reliance damages. For binary quantity choice, the …rst best can be reached. Section 6 explores the saddle point property beyond cooperative investments. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
The parties A and B are involved in a relationship of cooperative investments.
The investing party A faces, at stage 1, an investment decision r 2 R at costs g(r). Then, at stage 2, there is a random move ! 2 of nature. Party B's delivery choice y 2 Y is due at stage 3. Both decisions could be continuous or discrete and they are even allowed to be more than one-dimensional.
Before any compensation takes place, the net pro…ts of party A and B are denoted by A(r; !; y) and B(r; !; y), referred to as pre-law payo¤ functions.
To capture the cooperative nature of investments, it is assumed that A's payo¤ function A(r; !; y) = H(!; y)¡g(r) is additively separable in investments.
While A must cover investment costs g(r), investments do not directly affect his own bene…ts H(!; y) but they enter directly the other party's payo¤ function.
Our notation is general enough to cover both cases where the buyer or the seller is the investing party. The social surplus is denoted by W (r; !; y) = H(!; y) + B(r; !; y) ¡ g(r). For given investments r and move ! of nature, the socially best response is
The e¢cient investment decision solves
It is tacitly assumed that the above optimization problems have solutions.
Moreover, the socially best response to e¢cient investments y
is called the e¢cient delivery choice. It then follows from general principles of optimality that 
then it is governed by a regime of bilateral compensation. The aim of the present paper is to explore the incentives arising from such regimes.
The Main Results
The only assumption needed to establish the main results requires a delivery choice y H to exist such that The proof of this proposition will easily follow from the fact that, under a regime of bilateral compensation, the e¢cient solution is a saddle point of party B's post-law payo¤ function. More precisely, we …rst establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If, under a regime of bilateral compensation, the parties have signed a contract stipulating e¢cient investments (i.e. ¹ r = r ¤ ) and delivery choice ¹ y = y H , then the e¢cient solution is a saddle point of B's post-law payo¤ function, i.e.
holds for all r, ! and y.
Proof. The proof is very elementary. It follows from (3) and (4) that
must hold and from (2) and (4) and the fact of the e¢cient delivery choice y ¤ (!) being the socially best response to e¢cient investment that
must also hold. Moreover, since
it follows from (4) that
The saddle point property is fully established. It then follows from the saddle point property that, without loss of generality, B's best response to e¢cient investments is
For other investment levels, it follows from the saddle point property that Ã(r; !; y B (r; !))¸Ã(r; !; y ¤ (!))¸Ã(r ¤ ; !; y ¤ (!)) and, hence, A's expected payo¤ (recall (1)) Notice, if the contract would specify a delivery choice ¹ y 6 = y H such that, for some moves of nature at least,
then the e¢cient solution may violate the saddle-point property. In this sense it is crucial for e¢ciency to prevail that the original contract stipulates delivery choice y H .
In the case of sel…sh investments that enter directly the payo¤ function of the investing party, typically, no contract with state independent delivery choice will ensure the saddle-point property. For further comments on this issue, the reader is referred to section 6 of this paper.
The main conclusion of the present section is that, under any regime of bilateral compensation, the investing party in a setting of cooperative investments has e¢cient incentives to invest, no matter whether ine¢cient delivery choices are renegotiated or not. These …ndings are in contrast to those of Che and Chung (1999) . The next section examines the di¤erences. Che and Chung (1999) Hence B has the incentive to choose the socially best response y + (r; !).
Unilateral Expectation Damages
Therefore, party A's post-law payo¤ amounts to
from which it follows immediately that A has no incentives to invest.
Notice, under bilateral expectation damages, contracts specifying delivery choice y H provide …rst best incentives to invest while, under unilateral expectation damages, they provide no incentives at all.
At the other extreme, the case of contracts is considered which stipulate delivery choice y L . Under bilateral expectation damages, such contracts would perform worse than those which specify y H . Under unilateral expectation damages, however, the converse is true as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4 Suppose the initial contract speci…es delivery choice ¹ y = y L .
If parties anticipate ine¢cient delivery choices to be renegotiated then, under unilateral expectation damages, party A has incentives to invest according to
It holds that 0 · r u · r ¤ where, typically, both inequalities are strict. 
from which (7) follows immediately.
The …rst term in (7) attains its maximum at e¢cient investments r ¤ .
The second and third term, by assumption, are strictly decreasing in r. It follows that 0 · r u · r ¤ must hold indeed. In a di¤erentiable setting, the inequality would be strict because the derivative of the …rst term vanishes at r ¤ whereas the second and third term would have a negative derivative at r ¤ . Similarly, under mild assumptions, it must hold that r u > 0. The proposition is established.
In the binary choice setting of Che and Chung [1999] , the only two possibilities are to specify either ¹ y = y L or ¹ y = y H in the contract. Under unilateral expectation damages, specifying ¹ y = y L outperforms specifying ¹ y = y H .
Renegotiations are needed to ensure e¢cient delivery choice. Nevertheless, incentives to invest remain suboptimal.
Under bilateral expectation damages or, more generally, under a regime of bilateral compensation, specifying ¹ y = y H does not only outperform specifying ¹ y = y L but it even induces e¢cient investments and e¢cient delivery choice, no matter whether, o¤ the equilibrium path, renegotiations take place or can be ruled out.
Liquidated Reliance Damages
In the introduction, I have argued that party A would claim expectation damages and would not exert the option to obtain reliance damages instead.
Suppose, however, that parties have contractually agreed to liquidated damages that become due if party B fails to deliver and which mimic reliance damages. Liquidated damages of this kind have the potential to provide ef…cient incentives to invest, well in line with the earlier …ndings of Che and Chung (1999) .
Reliance damages are typically con…ned to binary delivery choice. So let us assume that Y = fy L ; y H g and that assumptions (5) and (6) holds for all r. If party B is the seller in a setting of quantity choice, this assumption would naturally hold: at zero production, the cost structure of B does not matter.
Finally, well in line with the nature of cooperative investments, it is assumed that g(r) is a strictly, B(r; !; y) at least a weakly increasing function of investments r 2 R ½ [0; 1).
In this section, contracts are considered which specify payments from A to B of the form
The term t is lump-sum, T is the price due in case of delivery (y = y H ) whereas B agrees to compensate for actual reliances g(r) if he fails to deliver (y = y L ). Given this contract, B's payo¤ amounts to Ã(r; !; y) = B(r; !; y) + ¿ (r; y):
The following proposition can be established.
Proposition 5 Suppose parties have signed the contract (8) and they anticipate ine¢cient delivery choices to be renegotiated. Then party A's incentives to invest r(T ) just depend on the price T . Moreover, there exist prices T L and T H which provide insu¢cient and excessive incentives to invest, respectively,
Hence, if r(T ) is a continuous function of the price then there exists a price T ¤ under which the e¢cient solution emerges, i.e.
Proof. Let 
Since B(r; !; y H ) + g(r) is strictly increasing in r, there exists a cut-o¤ valuê r(!; T ) such that y 0 (r; !; T ) = y H i¤ r >r(!; T ). If we write, for short, Á reneg (r; !; T ) = t + ®W (r; !; y + (r; !)) + M (r; !; T )
then it holds that
Notice, the function of the second line is strictly increasing whereas the function of the …rst line is strictly decreasing in r.
Given such a contract, the incentives to invest
just depend on the price T indeed which is due in case of delivery.
Choose T L such that
and T H such that
hold for all !. It then follows that ¹ r(!; T L ) < r ¤ and r ¤ < ¹ r(!; T H ) for all 
The continuity of r(T ) as a function of T would follow from the concavity of E[Á reneg (r; !; T )] as a function of r. If such is the case then, as the above proposition shows, the contract mimicing reliance damages and specifying the appropriate price T ¤ leads to the e¢cient solution. For such contracts to be veri…able, investment levels must be veri…able. Yet, if they are then bilateral expectation damages could also be enforced. Since bilateral expectation damages lead to e¢cient solutions more generally, the results of the present paper rehabilitate expectation damages for relationship-speci…c investments of the cooperative type.
The Saddle Point Property in General
In holds for all r; ! and y.
The proof can easily be adapted from that of Proposition 2 and, hence, need not be repeated here. In the case of cooperative investments, specifying a constant delivery choice was su¢cient to ensure the saddle point property.
In the case of sel…sh investments, stipulating a constant delivery choice would no longer ensure the saddle point property as I now want to illustrate in the following setting of continuous quantity choice. Suppose we are given a state of nature such that ¹ y < y ¤ (!) holds. Then
as follows from social surplus being a concave function of delivery choice y.
The above inequality would contradict the saddle point property. In other words,
for all states ! would be a necessary condition for the saddle point property to hold. For that reason, let us assume that (10) is met such that, for any level of investments r, B's payo¤ at e¢cient delivery choices amounts to
It follows that the derivative at e¢cient investments r
would typically be di¤erent from zero. In fact, since (9) and (10) hold, it would be su¢cient to assume, say, A ry (r; !; y) > 0 in order to ensure that E [A r (r ¤ ; !; ¹ y)] 6 = 0. Yet, if this derivative is di¤erent from zero, then the saddle point property cannot hold. Hence, for sel…sh investments, typically no state independent delivery choice ¹ y would ever induce the saddle point property.
Nevertheless, Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) have shown that, for sel…sh investments in the continuous quantity choice model, specifying a constant delivery choice may still provide e¢cient incentives to invest. To ensure the e¢cient delivery choice, they have to rely on renegotiations leading to socially best responses. Since the saddle point property does not hold, their argument is more intricate.
Concluding Remarks
The economic analysis of contract law has examined incentives for investments under various breach remedies. No doubt, for legal practice, the most prevalent measure is expectation damages. The early literature concentrates on sel…sh investments which directly bene…t the investing party. If the performance decision is binary and if investments are sel…sh then expectation damages lead to overreliance (Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984) ). For selfish investments, the …rst best is induced by expectation damages only if the performance decision is a continuous quantity choice and if ine¢cient delivery choices are renegotiated to the ex post e¢cient decision (Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) ).
The present paper revisits cooperative investments as …rst studied by Che and Chung (1999) . It argues that, in the case of cooperative investments, expectation damages are of a bilateral nature and, as a consequence, that a strict interpretation of legal provisions gives rise to the rule of bilateral expectation damages. This rule is shown to provide e¢cient incentives to invest, no matter whether renegotiations are ruled out or not and no matter whether the performance decision is binary or not. In this sense, expectation damages perform even better under cooperative than under sel…sh investments.
If Che and Chung attribute poor performance to expectation damages in the case of cooperative investments their …ndings rest on the assumption that only the investing party may claim damages for breach of contract.
Under such a rule, indeed, unilateral expectation damages lead to insu¢cient investments and other breach remedies may perform better. Therefore, the present paper propagates the idea that Che and Chung's pessimistic view does not follow from a basic defect of expectation damages but rather from neglecting the bilateral nature which expectation damages naturally feature in the case of cooperative investments.
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